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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs . 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 95-0280 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2-3 (i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
The Court should review this case using an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall, 787 P. 2d 744, (Utah, 
1987) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as 
Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of a 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea submitted by the defendant/ 
appellant on the 9th day of June, 1994. The motion was denied by 
two separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supplementary 
ruling dated July 12, 1994, 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District 
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February, 
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of 
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated. Each count also provided a 
Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-203 Utah 
Code. On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty 
to Count One of the Information. Count Two of the information was 
dismissed. The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used 
to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/Appellant's Rule 
11(e) rights at the time of plea. After a colloquy with the 
Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea. 
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of 
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. The Defendant/ 
Appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence at the Utah 
State Prison of 15 years to life with a firearm enhancement 
requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served consecutively 
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with the 15 years to life sentence. On May 20, 1987 at the request 
of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court reviewed the 
Defendant/Appellant's sentence. The court, the Honorable Dennis 
Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence originally imposed. On 
June 9, 1994, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
before the Eighth District Court. The plea was defective in that 
the elements of the offense were not explained to Defendant/ 
Appellant. It was further defective in that the trial court did 
not give the Defendant/Appellant the proper maximum punishment, nor 
explain the nature of the Utah indeterminative sentencing. Counsel 
for the Defendant/Appellant's performance was inadequate in that 
he did not explain any of the required Pre-requisites to a valid 
plea. The information was defective in that it did not adequately 
identify any victim of the alleged crime. Counsel's performance 
was also deficient in that he also did pursue any information to 
cure the defective information. All the prior judges having 
retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case was re-assigned to 
the Honorable John R. Anderson. Judge Anderson issued a summary 
ruling to the motion to dismiss, the State having given no response 
to the motion. That ruling, dated June 29, 1994 denied all aspects 
of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea excepting for a 
response by the State the issue of an inadequate explanation of 
the firearms enhancement. After considering the State's response, 
on July 12, 1994 and giving the Defendant no opportunity to 
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consider the State's response, Judge Anderson issued a ruling 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in its 
entirety stating that the court had substantially complied with the 
requirements of Rule 11(e), 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
is in error. The court made no findings that the appellant waived 
his right to self incrimination. The court made no findings that 
the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and 
that his plea admitted each and every element. The court 
incorrectly advised the defendant as to the maximum sentence which 
could be imposed. The information was deficient in that it did not 
advise the Defendant/Appellant of the identity of the victims. 
Defendant/Appellant was deprived of key elements of effective of 
counsel in that no discovery was requested, discussed with 
Defendant/Appellant, nor were there any attempts to explain the 
sentencing, or cure the defective information. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE IT FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e) OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect 
at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-35-
11(e) provided as follows: 
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) until the 
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court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel 
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all 
of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited. From the 
record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the 
court can only determine the trial court's compliance with rule 
11(e) based on the oral representations made in open court. 
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on 
several critical points included in the rule. There is no 
discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right 
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3) 
of the rule* There is no discussion of the nature and elements of 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement 
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule. There is no discussion 
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or record that the guilty plea was an admission to each of the 
elements of the alleged crime as required by subsection 4 (Record, 
PP 4-7). 
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative mis-
represented to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a 
result of the plea. Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding 
that the defendant understands both the minimum and maximum 
possible sentence. At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial 
judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement 
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally 
explained. No correction of that error was made. The appellant 
was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct 
contradiction to what had been explained. 
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an 
"abuse of discretion" by the court. The companion cases of Warner 
vs. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks vs. Morris, 709 
P. 2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial 
court accepts guilty pleas. The Supreme Court stated that a 
failure of to advise a defendant of his rights concerning self-
incrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea 
provided that the record as a whole showed that the rule 11 
requirements were substantially complied with. Subsequently the 
Supreme Court in State vs. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987) 
replaced the "substantial compliance" rule with a "strict 
compliance" standard. It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was 
not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are 
6 
useful. In Gibbons the court stated that the trial court may not 
rely on defense counsel or affidavits to satisfy the specific 
requirements of Rule 11(e). In his case, where there is no 
affidavit, the court has a situation much more akin to Gibbons 
factually than might typically be the case. 
The case most similar to this which was reached the appellate 
courts is that of State vs. Vasilacopulas, 756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. , 
1988). The Utah Court of Appeals, using the Warner-Brooks test 
found that an absence of discussion concerning the possibility of 
consecutive sentences, and a failure to find that the defendant 
understood that possibility showed a failure to substantially 
comply with Rule 11(e). That alone was sufficient to mandate a 
reversal of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. The court did not consider a failure to 
comply with Rule 11(e) (4), citing the failure to comply with the 
sentencing proportions of the rule as being sufficient. It can be 
presumed that if there had been a problem with an explanation of 
the elements of the offense as there was in this case, the 
Vasilacopulas Court should have only made its decision stronger. 
It is also interesting to note that one of the concurring judges 
in Vasilacopulos was Richard Davidson, the trial judge who took the 
plea in this case. 
In this case, we have three major failures to even discuss 
rights required by the rule. While the Warner and Brooks cases 
state that a failure to explain the right of self incrimination was 
not fatal in light of the record, the record there was more 
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complete that here. Here as well, we have not only a failure to 
inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation 
by the court as to the maximum sentence. WHen coupled with the 
failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is 
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been 
substantially complied with. Finally, even though there was some 
discussion of some of the RUle 11 requirements at the time the plea 
was entered, no findings were made except that the plea was 
knowingly made. (Record p 8 ) . 
POINT II 
THE PLEA WAS IMPROPERLY TAKEN BECAUSE THE INFORMATION 
DID NOT ADEQUATELY INFORM THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CHARGES. 
The information to which the Defendant/Appellant alleges as 
follows: 
Count : AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, in violation Section 
76-5-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, on or 
about February 17, 1986, in Uintah County, Utah, a First 
Degree Felony; 
The said defendant at the time and place aforesaid 
did intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim, by any means and in 
any manner, seized, confined, detained, or transported 
the victim with intent: 
a. To hold for ransom or reward, or as shield 
of hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
b. To facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of felony; or 
c. To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize 
the victim or another. . . . 
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There is no mention at any time in the information any name or 
other identification of any victim. This lack deprived the 
Defendant/Appellant of the opportunity of knowing what the charges 
effectively were against him and further complicated the inadequacy 
of the entry of guilty plea. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Wilcox, 808 P 2d. 1028, 
(Utah 1991), stated that a defendant is entitled to adequate notice 
of the proceedings being brought against him. That notice requires 
the prosecution to state the charge with sufficient specificity to 
protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime 
and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a 
defense. See State v. Strand, 720 P 2d. 425 (Utah 1986), and State 
v. Bundy, 684 P 2d. 58 (Utah 1984). The Court further stated that 
"because of the almost infinite variety of circumstance where the 
question may arise, there are few ironclad rules for determining 
the adequacy of notice beyond the requirements that the elements 
of the offense be alleged. M The court then stated that there 
should be a weighing of the completeness of the notice and its 
adequacy against the background of the information immediately 
available to the prosecution. 
In this case, there were multiple victims alleged. It appears 
that the identity of those victims was available to the prosecutor 
at the time the information was filed. In order to prevent 
multiple prosecutions for the same offense, the name of the victim 
of each offense must be stated. This is mere common sense. While 
The Wilcox also states that the notice requirements may be waived 
9 
and that the filing of a bill of particulars is normally one of the 
proper remedies to an inadequate information, that statement only 
illustrates another issue which will be addressed later in this 
matter, that is, the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The lack of identity of the victims illustrates again the 
inadequacy of the inquiry at the time of the taking of his plea. 
It has already been stated that the record is bereft of any 
discussion of the elements of the offense charged. Because no bill 
of particulars was filed, the Defendant/Appellant did not have a 
more specific information that the original one which was filed. 
There is no indication that any request for discovery was ever 
filed nor that any discovery was given to the defendant. All of 
these things which might have had some curative effect upon the 
lack of the notice in the information did not occur. The failure 
to explain the elements of the crime, and to get a factual basis 
for the plea become even worse. 
POINT 3 
THE INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FURTHER IMPAIRED 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEEDINGS 
WHEN THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN. 
The performance of defense counsel in adequately representing 
his client is always a difficult issue in that much of any 
representation is not on the record. The attorney client privilege 
makes it difficult for an attorney to respond to ineffective 
assistance accusations, nevertheless there is guidance on what 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In State v. 
Moritzsky, 771 P 2d. 689 (Utah App. 1989), Defense attorney Lance 
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Wilkerson, the then Uintah County Public Defender, was found to 
have ineffectively assisted his client by failing to explore or 
request any instruction concerning the defense of habitation. 
Citing State v. Verde, 770 P 2d. 116 (Utah 1989) the appellate 
court stated the following test: "Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
challenge to his conviction will be successful only if he can prove 
that (1) his counsel rendered and objectively deficient 
performance, demonstrated by specific acts or omissions; and (2) 
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e. a reasonable 
probability' exist that but for counsel's omissions, the verdict 
would have been more favorable to defendant. 
While the court must not second guess tactical decisions made by 
counsel, the tactical analysis has little relevance in this case. 
In this case, Uintah County Public Defender Lance Wilkerson 
failed to request discovery. He failed to request a bill of 
particulars to clarify or cure an information that was devoid of 
notice of the identity of the alleged victim. He failed to explain 
the elements of the charge to his client. He failed to assist the 
court in establishing any factual basis for the entry of this plea. 
He failed to explain the nature of the firearm enhancement which 
was charged and sentenced to his client. He failed to appeal the 
errors in this plea immediately upon sentencing. 
The specific acts or omissions required have been shown 
precisely by the inadequacy of the record in this case. The second 
prong is harder to address because this is guilty plea case. To 
adequately assess whether a trial verdict would have been more 
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favorable to defendant/appellant than his plea is difficult. It 
must be noted however that since the defendant/appellant received 
the maximum sentence allowed by law for one count of aggravated 
kidnapping, and the statutory preference was for concurrent 
sentences at the time, it is hard to say that no better result 
could have been obtained for the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by the 
court and counsel in the taking of appellant's plea. It does not 
show strict compliance, substantial compliance, or anything 
approaching the required standard. The process was further 
complicated by defense counsel's ineffective performance in the 
process of the plea. Since the information was defective in notice 
to the defendant, the problem grew even worse. Appellant hereby 
prays that the court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this [ day of fih>T I \ > 1996. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that three true and correct copies of the 
foregoing brief were mailed or hand delivered to Jan Graham, 
Attorney for Appellee, at 262 State Capital on this * day 
of frflr^ V , 1996. 
(JA.- KMJ//A^^ 
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ADDENDUM 
An Addendum is not needed in this case. 
